Crypto: Aave V4 Surpasses One Billion Dollars, Driven by Multisig

At the end of March, Aave launched its V4, a new version of its lending protocol with a simple approach: start small and then expand gradually. Six months later, adoption seems to be strong. Indeed, the V4 of the protocol has reached one billion dollars in deposits.

On a protocol like Aave, you don’t deposit any amount of any asset. Each market has a cap, and beyond that, deposits are refused. These caps start low on purpose, and raising them allows for growth. Indeed, Aave V4 introduces a new approach to managing the maximum capacities of its pools.

Key Points

• V4 has been live since March 30, 2026. According to various metrics, it hovers around one billion dollars in deposits; the exact figure varies from source to source.
• This increase followed a series of cap raises, not a spontaneous rush.
• Most of these raises were not voted on individually by AAVE holders.
• They were executed by a small group controlling a multisig vault, following a public risk recommendation.
• A typical vote takes about two weeks. This committee can act in a matter of hours.

Around One Billion, Depending on How You Count

Announced in 2024 by Stani Kulechov and then postponed, Aave V4 was deployed on Ethereum on March 30, 2026. Its architecture is called Hub and Spoke. It consists of a central liquidity reserve (the hub) that feeds into distinct borrowing markets (the spokes), each with its own collateral rules. The idea is to pool funds instead of letting them sit in as many silos as there are markets. An approach focused on capital efficiency.

By mid-September, several counts had pushed V4 above one billion dollars in deposited assets. These calculations were presented by Sumcap.xyz, which has closely monitored the evolution of V4 since its deployment. V3, on the other hand, still exceeds 30 billion supplied.

This growth has a well-identified driver. On V4, the old << supply caps >> and << borrow caps >> become roughly add caps (what a spoke is allowed to deposit in the hub) and draw caps (what it is allowed to borrow). A saturated cap refuses new deposits. It also limits Aave's exposure to an asset. Thus, if its price drops or its liquidity evaporates, the volume of potential bad debts remains limited.

Not a Vote for Every Increase

Until V4, cap raises, which concretely allowed the protocol to accept more of an asset, were decided via a governance vote. Now, it’s LlamaRisk, a risk provider mandated by the DAO, that publishes the << rounds >> of raises on the forum. The changes themselves are now applied via the Security Council, a multisig, which executes a transaction only if multiple keys sign. AAVE holders did not vote << yes >> or << no >> for each increase from 10,000 to 15,000 ETH. They vote on heavy actions: launching V4, listing a market, deploying a chain, granting a mandate. On a daily basis, the caps are the responsibility of LlamaRisk and the Security Council.

Thus, the majority of the increases that made this growth possible were signed by a multisig rather than adopted by an on-chain vote. In other words, it was not the assembly of tokenholders that opened the floodgates one by one.

The Risk Stewards

The regime that the DAO voted on as early as V3 is called the Risk Stewards. It allows a risk committee to adjust certain parameters without convening all AAVE holders. The scope is locked by code: maximum range per update, delay before touching the same asset again, prohibition on listing a new asset or moving outside the bounds. This is the model << the DAO sets the corridor, the committee drives within it >>.

On V4, it is not yet the tool that has made the most progress. An ARFC from August 2026, followed by a Snapshot and an AIP (proposal 523), aims to connect the Stewards to Ethereum and Avalanche. By the end of September, LlamaRisk indicated that the adjustments for Ethereum and Avalanche were still going through the Security Council, except for Arc, which had already been addressed via the Stewards.

The recommendations today mainly come from LlamaRisk, along with Aave Labs. Chaos Labs exited the framework in the spring of 2026.

The gain is primarily temporal. Forum, Snapshot of about five days, on-chain voting, execution delay, the entire procedure previously took about two weeks. The Council or Steward brings this down to a few hours.

The Tension Remains the Same, the Contract is Not the Same

A handful of keys that arbitrate the exposure of a market aiming for a billion does not align well with the image of a protocol governed in a decentralized manner. Historically, the Aave Chan Initiative, long one of the main delegates, founded by Marc Zeller, defended this division of labor. ACI announced in March 2026 that it would not renew and has stepped back. The argument, however, did not leave with the team. Proponents of systematic voting argue that a mandate that is too broad ultimately empties the ballot box of its substance.

Delegation also has a security cost. A multisig involves private keys. A Steward constrained by the code limits the damage; even if compromised, it cannot list a phantom asset or multiply a ceiling by ten in one move. The Security Council from the launch phase has a broader mandate because V4 opened its doors empty and needed to be able to open quickly. It is a different risk profile, even if each increase remains a public transaction, preceded by a dated recommendation on the forum.

In a bank, this kind of committee operates behind closed doors. At Aave, one can review the transaction. AAVE holders can revoke a mandate through a vote. Since V3, they have rather expanded it. In V4, they are only just beginning to transpose it into the contract designed for that.

The slider between speed and control has therefore not disappeared. It has changed shape; six months of V4 have been written with a launch Council. The future will depend on what the DAO really leaves to the Stewards once their roles are firmly connected. In parallel, the protocol has removed several blockchains and assets deemed phantom from its offering.